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LESSONS FROM U.S. COASTAL WIND
POOLS ABOUT CLIMATE FINANCE
AND POLITICS
DONALD T. HORNSTEIN *
Abstract: The financial costs of extreme weather are profound, not only in
terms of the distress of those immediately affected but also in broader, more
long-term macroeconomic and public budgetary effects. This Article focuses
on the role that private and public insurance can play, both positively and negatively, on these effects. It also provides one of the most detailed analyses in
the legal literature to date on the finances of three state residual-risk wind
pools in the Gulf and Southeastern United States that have been created specifically with hurricane risks in mind.

INTRODUCTION
Insurance is the world’s largest industry because it offers products that
are regarded as essential to financial resilience in the face of risk. 1 But, as
applied to the risk of loss from catastrophic weather, the role of the insurance industry is mixed. On the one hand, the industry participates in global
climate initiatives such as the United Nations December 2015 climate conference in Paris, and offers products for weather-related risks through both
traditional reinsurance markets and newer financial markets in catastrophe
bonds (“cat bonds”) and other types of insurance-linked securities. 2 On the
© 2016, Donald T. Hornstein. All rights reserved.
*
Aubrey L. Brooks Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law, and
Member, Board of Directors, NC Insurance Underwriting Association (“NCIUA”). All views
expressed herein are my own as a law professor, and are not intended to represent the views of the
NCIUA, or even to reflect my views as a Board member. Special thanks to Shannon O’Neil for
outstanding research assistance.
1
See Evan Mills, Insurance in a Climate of Change, 309 SCI. 1040, 1040 (2005) (“As the
world’s largest industry, the [insurance industry] would be the third largest country if its $3.2
trillion in yearly revenues were compared with national gross domestic products . . . .”).
2
See GENEVA ASS’N, CLIMATE RISK STATEMENT OF THE GENEVA ASSOCIATION (2014)
https://www.genevaassociation.org/media/878686/ga2014-climate-risk-statement.pdf [https://perma.
cc/X6T3-NN9V]; MUNICH RE, ROAD TO PARIS: 2015—A CRUCIAL YEAR FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
(2015), https://www.munichre.com/site/corporate/get/documents_E-1635640145/mr/assetpool.shared/
Documents/0_Corporate%20Website/1_The%20Group/Focus/Climate%20Change/munichre-roadto-paris-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B99-UDN7]; J. David Cummins & Pauline Barrieu, Innovations in Insurance Markets: Hybrid and Securitized Risk-Transfer-Solutions, in DIONNE’S HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 547, 552 (2d ed. 2013) (although new issues of cat bonds dropped in 2008–
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other hand, at least in the United States, the insurance industry is largely
absent from most primary climate-related markets. Since 1968, the insurance industry in the United States has refused to cover flood losses.3 And in
the early 21st Century, most major insurers have fled voluntary wind coverage just as surely as they fled flood insurance fifty years ago. 4 There is a
growing literature on flood insurance and, especially in the United States,
on the National Flood Insurance Program that has replaced the private market. 5 But there has been much less written about wind insurance and the
state-by-state residual risk programs that now dominate markets in hurricane-prone regions of the Southeastern and Gulf states. This Article seeks to
help fill that gap.
I. WHY IT MATTERS: THE PERILS OF NOT GETTING THE FINANCING
QUESTION RIGHT
Before pivoting to state wind programs in the United States, it is helpful to step back and contemplate the worldwide consequences of not having
in place a financial plan for weather catastrophes. Consider Hurricane Ivan
and the economic effects of natural disasters on developing countries generally. Ivan came ashore in September 2004 as a Category 3 hurricane in both
the United States and Grenada.6 In the United States, although it caused
$22.5 billion in damages (in 2014 dollars) and registered as the sixth costliest hurricane in U.S. history, Hurricane Ivan only affected less than 0.2% of
2009, the market “recovered quickly and 2010 was the third largest year on record with new issuance of $4.3 billion”); Giuseppe Turchetti et al., Natural and Man-Made Disasters: Challenges &
International Perspective for Insurance, in INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE LAW 685, 697
(Andrea de Guttry et al. eds., 2012).
3
See Donald T. Hornstein, The Balkanization of CAT Property Insurance: Financing and
Fragmentation in Storm Risks, 11 RUTGERS J.L. PUB. POL’Y 9, 13–14 (“‘[W]ater’ or ‘flood’ exclusions became standard in private, all-risk property insurance when the NFIP was created by the
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968.”).
4
See infra note 76 and accompanying text (describing how, as private insurers left voluntary
wind markets, the rise of quasi-public coastal policies issued by state residual risk “insurers of last
resort” grew by 1517 percent between 1990 and 2012).
5
See Ernest B. Abbott, Flood Insurance and Climate Change: Rising Sea Levels Challenge
the NFIP, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 10, 10 (2014); Sarah Fox, This Is Adaptation: The Elimination of Subsidies Under the National Flood Insurance Program, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205,
205 (2014); Jennifer Wriggens, Flood Money: The Challenge of U.S. Flood Insurance Reform in a
Warming World, 119 PENN. ST. L. REV. 361, 361 (2014).
6
See ERIC. S. BLAKE & ETHAN J. GIBNEY, NAT’L WEATHER SERVICE, THE DEADLIEST,
COSTLIEST, AND MOST INTENSE UNITED STATES TROPICAL CYCLONES FROM 1851 TO 2010 (AND
OTHER FREQUENTLY REQUESTED HURRICANE FACTS) 1, 9 (2011), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/
nws-nhc-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2HD-H537]; Angela Levins, Remembering Hurricane Ivan 10
Years Later, the Storm That Wouldn’t Die, AL.COM (Nov. 2, 2015, 4:48 PM), http://www.al.com/
news/mobile/index.ssf/2014/09/remembering_hurricane_ivan_10.html [https://perma.cc/23NA-Y2YJ].
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U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) and the United States was easily able to
absorb nationally the acute costs that the storm imposed regionally. 7 In contrast, in Grenada, Ivan caused $900 million in damages, affecting almost
200% of Grenada’s GDP, requiring the country to spend much of the next
five years recovering from the direct effects of this single storm and resulting a decade later in Grenada’s public-debt-to-GDP ratio of 110%, leaving
the country with “limited room to engage in public investments and social
spending.” 8 Hurricane Ivan’s effect on Grenada captures the effects, worldwide, that natural disasters can have on developing economies. 9 Thus, in
2015, U.N. member states convened in Sendai, Japan for the Third World
Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, noting that dollars spent in disaster
recovery are unavailable for poverty reduction, improved education, and
food security—expenditures necessary to progress toward the U.N.’s (thenproposed, now recently adopted) Sustainable Development Goals. 10
Countries with more developed economies are also at risk of long-term
financial impacts. Although there is a fairly robust debate in the macroeconomic literature about the long-term effects on GDP caused by losses due to
violent weather, there are reasons to fear that cumulative expenditures on
catastrophic weather, even in a highly developed country such as the United
States, are far from benign. 11 In 2012, the year Superstorm Sandy hit the
7
See BLAKE & GIBNEY, supra note 6, at 9 tbl.3a; Hurricane Ivan, WORLD PUB. LIBRARY,
http://www.worldlibrary.org/Article.aspx?ArticleId=0000961346&Title=hurricane%20ivan [https://
perma.cc/M6RE-RWTC]. Measured in 2004 dollars, Hurricane Ivan caused an estimated $18.82
billion in damage in the United States, less than 0.2% of the U.S. GDP in 2004, which was approximately $12.27 trillion. See STACY R. STEWART, NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE IVAN 1, 9 (2004), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL092004_
Ivan.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RYB-XA6P]; GDP at Market Prices (Current US$), WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?page=2 [https://perma.cc/XBQ7-P9ZA].
8
See About Grenada: Economy, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE GOV’T OF GRENADA (May 7,
2013, 10:42 AM), http://www.gov.gd/economy.html [https://perma.cc/6PGS-WUKR].
9
See Grenada Economy 2016, THEODORA.COM, http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/grenada/
grenada_economy.html [https://perma.cc/HB6K-PJH8] (citing 2016 WORLD FACT BOOK OF THE
UNITED STATES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY).
10
See UNITED NATIONS, SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION: 2015–2030,
at 5–11 (2015), http://www.unisdr.org/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7JAW-63FY]; see also Donald T. Hornstein, The Insurance Industry on the Cusp of COP 21:
Lessons from Flood Insurance Reform in the US and UK, in FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF CONSUMER
FLOOD INSURANCE IN THE UK, REFLECTIONS UPON THE CREATION OF FLOOD RE 7, 7 (Johanna
Hjalmarsson ed., 2015) (stating that worldwide, the problem is getting worse as uninsured losses
exceed insured losses at an increasing rate, putting pressure on public expenditures, desperately
needed elsewhere, to try to help fill the gap).
11
Compare Eric Strobl, The Economic Growth Impact of Hurricanes: Evidence from US
Coastal Counties 2, 4 (IZA & Ecole Polytechnique, Discussion Paper No. 3619, 2008), http://ftp.
iza.org/dp3619.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VGW-LHCP] (“Hurricane strikes do not appear to be economically important enough to be reflected in national economic growth rates.”), with Solomon
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United States, the federal government made almost $100 billion in unplanned expenditures for extreme weather events, representing that year’s
single largest nondefense discretionary outlay, amounting to more than total
federal expenditures that year for either transportation or education.12 Although these federal budget outlays were unusually high in 2012, there exists in the United States (a) an internal political dynamic that results in an
ever-escalating rate of presidential disaster declarations, (b) added to the
ability and proclivity under current congressional budget rules to provide
disaster payments through emergency appropriations outside of normal
budget procedures or politically-imposed budget caps, 13 (c) which occurs
while there exists substantive rate suppression by which both federal floodinsurance and state wind-insurance rates are kept below actuarially-fair levels, 14 (d) that results in the moral hazard of encouraging more development
in at-risk areas, 15 (e) which results in ever-escalating economic losses even

M. Hsiang & Amir S. Jina, The Causal Effect of Environmental Catastrophe on Long-Run Economic Growth: Evidence from 6,700 Cyclones 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 20352, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20352.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ALK-2LHE] (“[W]e
find robust evidence that national incomes decline, relative to their pre-disaster trend, and do not
recover within twenty years. Both rich and poor countries exhibit this response . . . .”), and Goetz
von Peter et al., Unmitigated Disasters? New Evidence on the Macroeconomic Cost of Natural
Catastrophes (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 394, 2012), http://www.bis.org/
publ/work394.pdf [https://perma.cc/VHP6-K8BN] (“[M]ajor natural catastrophes have large and
significant negative effects on economic activity, both on impact and over the longer run.”). See
generally Julie Borowski, Recent Tornadoes and the Broken Window Fallacy, FREEDOMWORKS
BLOG (June 2, 2011), http://www.freedomworks.org/content/recent-tornadoes-and-broken-windowfallacy [https://perma.cc/8UZW-P68T] (explaining that suffering a natural disaster is not a boon to
local economies).
12
See DANIEL LASHOF & ANDY STEVENSON, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, WHO PAYS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE? U.S. TAXPAYERS OUTSPEND PRIVATE INSURERS THREE-TO-ONE TO COVER CLIMATE DISRUPTION COSTS 3 (2013), http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/files/taxpayer-climatecosts-IP.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AR7-YDEV] (“In 2012, the federal government spent $96 billion to
clean up the disastrous effects of climate disruption.”).
13
See Philip O. Shapiro, Note, A Sustainable Budget Should Endure Any Storm, 17 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 595, 607–17, 610 n.80 (2014).
14
See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance 3–5 (U. Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 111, 2015), http://
repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1221&context=law_econ_current [https://
perma.cc/H7CE-6VRU] (“As a result of government intervention in property insurance markets,
through either rate regulation or direct government provision of subsidized insurance, private
markets no longer generate prices signals regarding the cost of living in severe weather regions.
The cost of insurance is suppressed . . . .”).
15
See Hornstein, supra note 3, at 24 n.85 (“22 studies show an increase in disaster losses in
recent decades, [with] 14 of them accredit[ing] conflating factors, including wealth/population
increases in areas of weather-related risk . . . .”) (citing Laurens M. Bouwer, Have Disaster Losses
Increased Due to Anthropogenic Climate Change?, 92 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 39,
41–42 (2011)); see also BLAKE & GIBNEY, supra note 6, at 6 (“Continued coastal growth and
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if storm strength/frequency itself is no worse than that which existed historically, 16 (f) and that definitely results in even-more-escalating economic
losses when climate change affects sea levels or storm frequency/intensity, 17
such that (g) whatever the combinations of (a)-(f) the United States is as a
factual matter already spending such an increasingly large part of the federal budget for weather disasters that researchers at the National Bureau of
Economic Research estimate that, over the next seventy-five years, it will
require aggregate expenditures between $1.2–$7.1 trillion (depending on
assumptions of growth and discount rates)—roughly the same level of expenditure as that necessary in the United States over the same time period to
keep Social Security solvent. 18 Accordingly, even in a country as rich, geographically diversified, and financially sophisticated as the United States, if
we stay with our current spending plan for catastrophic weather, it may in
this century undermine our own ability to maintain our standard of living.
In short, we’re roughly in the same boat as Grenada. Indeed, without getting
its weather finances right, the whole world will be in the same boat as Grenada. British economist Nicholas Stern estimates that, worldwide, government expenditures for catastrophic weather by 2050 could range between
$850 billion to $1.3 trillion annually. 19 In a world in which there are no free
lunches, this level of annual expenditure will come at the expense of economic development and worldwide standards of living. 20
At this point, it is worth emphasizing how private insurance can improve overall economic resilience, and why the world is worse off when it
lacks functioning insurance markets to stand between human losses and
governments-as-insurers-of-last-resort. First, to start with the obvious, the
more private insurance is engaged, the more of a financial buffer exists between storm losses and the need for governmental expenditures.21 The Loninflation will almost certainly result in every future major landfalling hurricane (and even weaker
hurricanes and tropical storms) replacing one of the current costliest hurricanes.”).
16
BLAKE & GIBNEY, supra note 6, at 6.
17
See Hsiang & Jina, supra note 11, at 3 (“It is expected that the frequency and intensity of
cyclones will change in response to climate change, which our results indicate may have important
economic consequences.”) (citations omitted).
18
See J. David Cummins et al., Federal Financial Exposure to Natural Catastrophe Risk, in
MEASURING AND MANAGING FEDERAL FINANCIAL RISK 61, 63 (Deborah Lucas ed., 2010) (noting that net present value of the unfunded liability of next 75 years’ worth of federal extreme
weather expenditures to be between $1.2 trillion and $7.1 trillion, in comparison to the net present
value over the same time period of a projected Social Security shortfall of $4.9 trillion).
19
See Donald T. Hornstein, Insurance at the Energy-Water Nexus, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 1033,
1041 (2014).
20
See Hsiang & Jina, supra note 11, at 1, 16 (“Both rich and poor countries exhibit this response, with losses magnified in countries with less historical cyclone experience.”).
21
See Hornstein, supra note 10, at 7.
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don Market Group reported in 2014 that, as to worldwide natural disasters,
only about 25–30% of losses are insured, with 65–70% uninsured, a gap
that is actually widening. 22 This is an especially bad scenario in developing
economies because, as was the case in Grenada, it means that more public
money will be spent on disaster recovery and will therefore be less available
for the public expenditures necessary to reach goals in education, publichealth, and poverty-reduction. 23 More broadly, uninsured catastrophe losses
have macroeconomic costs: they negatively affect economic growth whereas “well-insured catastrophes . . . can be [financially] inconsequential or a
positive for growth over the medium term as insurance payouts help fund
reconstruction efforts.” 24
Second, a properly priced private insurance regime sends market signals
to insureds to avoid particularly risky undertakings (because premium prices
will skyrocket) and/or to adopt cost-effective precautionary measures that
reduce risk. 25 As one study found as to weather catastrophes, “[i]nsurance
arrangements . . . contribute to prevention and disaster management ex ante,”
for example, by providing incentives “to establish advanced building codes.”26
Insurance payouts also are targeted at “those facilities that private agents had
deemed important enough ex ante to warrant insurance coverage, often ones
that serve a productive purpose.” 27 This is one reason why catastrophe coverage via insurance is thought “to contribute more toward economic recovery
than ex post compensation in the form of aid or government relief programs.” 28
In addition, the benefits from private insurance markets are magnified
in a world where worst-case scenarios themselves are deteriorating. In the
United States, for example, catastrophe models show that damages from
previous storms that struck populated areas would today be much worse due
to the increased numbers and higher values of at-risk properties. 29 Similar
22

See id.
See About Grenada: Economy, supra note 8.
24
See von Peter et al., supra note 11, at 1.
25
Haitao Yin et al., Does Private Insurance Reduce Environmental Accidents?, REG., Summer 2012, at 26, 37 (stating that an analogous effect was documented in a study by Haitao Yin,
Howard Kunreuther, and Mathew White, where there was found to be a dramatic decline in leaks
from underground fuel tanks when gas stations were required to carry private cleanup and liability
insurance; the study found that the insurance pricing structure gave “[gas] tank owners economic
incentives to invest in equipment that reduce[d] the chance of accidental fuel tank leaks”).
26
See von Peter et al., supra note 11, at 4, 16.
27
Id. at 21.
28
Id.
29
See KAREN CLARK & CO., INCREASING CONCENTRATIONS OF PROPERTY VALUES AND
CATASTROPHE RISK IN THE US 5 (2015), http://www.karenclarkandco.com/news/publications/pdf/
KCC_Industry_Exposure_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/39L3-X6KE]; Press Release, Ins. Info. Inst.,
23
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vulnerabilities are also reflected in an analysis of several meteorological
near-misses. Thus, to return to Hurricane Ivan in 2004, at one point the
storm was projected by tracking models to present a one-in-four chance of a
“direct hit” on New Orleans which, had it occurred, could have imposed
total losses in excess of $100 billion, an amount exceeded only by Hurricane Katrina two years later, reducing the chances that New Orleans would
have been rebuilt at all.30 A decade later, at the onset of the 2015 Atlantic
hurricane season, disaster modelers predicted that if Miami were to be hit
by a Category 5 storm (a storm with a 1-in-100 chance of occurring), the
losses could cost $250 billion. 31 There is a real danger of being thinly capitalized in the face of such an event, even to a political entity as vibrant as
the State of Florida. 32 In September 2008, when Hurricane Ike briefly
threatened Miami with a Category 4 strike, an earlier warning from the
Fitch ratings agency in March 2008 had already warned that if a major
storm were to “hit[] Florida, ‘the fragile [insurance] market could effectively collapse.’” 33
Having underscored the value of private insurance markets, however,
how do we explain the flight from primary coverage of catastrophic weather
risks by private insurers? In a word, the most frequently given rationale is
that such risks are “uninsurable.” 34

Catastrophe Losses Will Double About Every 10 Years, Says Leading Catastrophe Modeling
Expert at PCS Conference (Apr. 25, 2006), http://www.iii.org/press-release/catastrophe-losseswill-double-about-every-10-years-says-leading-catastrophe-modeling-expert-at-pcs-conference042506 [https://perma.cc/5VHK-QYR8] (noting that one expert predicts that catastrophe storm
losses could follow a perverse variation of Moore’s Law and “double about every ten years due to
increases in the numbers and values of properties at risk”).
30
See Shirley Laska, What if Hurricane Ivan Had Not Missed New Orleans?, 78 SOC. INQUIRY 2, 174, 177–78 (2008); Hurricane Katrina Statistics Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 24, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/23/us/hurricane-katrina-statistics-fast-facts/ [https://perma.cc/9KJZHRNC] (citing FEMA’s estimate that Hurricane Katrina caused $108 billion in damages).
31
See Ryan Yousefi, 100-Year Hurricane Could Cost $250 Billion if It Hit Miami, MIAMI NEW
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015, 11:30 AM), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/100-year-hurricane-couldcost-250-billion-if-it-hit-miami-7572520 [https://perma.cc/98DX-3TJ5].
32
See Michael Grunwald, Could Florida Survive the Big One?, TIME (Sept. 5, 2008), http://
content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1839219,00.html.
33
Id.; Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Comments on Florida Homeowners Insurance Market
(Mar. 24, 2008, 11:28 AM), https://www.fitchratings.com/site/fitch-home/pressrelease?id=413634
[https://perma.cc/GN8W-825A].
34
See Véronique Bruggeman et al., Insurance Against Catastrophe: Government Stimulation
of Insurance Markets for Catastrophic Events, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185, 194 (2012)
(catastrophe insurance needs to be bundled with ordinary car and home insurance because otherwise damage from catastrophic events “would normally be considered uninsurable”).
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II. WHY WE LACK PROPERLY FUNCTIONING PRIVATE
INSURANCE MARKETS FOR CATASTROPHIC WEATHER—
THE STANDARD ECONOMIC ARGUMENT
When insurers claim that weather catastrophes are “uninsurable,” they
typically mean that the normal risk-transferring advantages of insurance do
not apply when catastrophes occur. 35 Insurance works best when the underlying risks are randomized and independent because it offers a win-win
proposition for both buyer and seller. 36 Take, for example, a woman contemplating automobile liability insurance. The buyer (driver) does not know
whether she will get into an auto accident in the upcoming year, let alone
whether she might cause the accident; thus, the “variance” that she will suffer a financial loss is high. 37 But she knows that there is some chance that
she might cause an accident with resulting personal injury or property damage, potentially exposing her to legal costs and thousands of dollars of liability. 38 The insurer, although also not knowing whether this particular driver will cause an accident, nonetheless knows statistically to a very level of
confidence how many accidents overall are likely to occur in the territories
it insures. 39 Because of the law of large numbers, the variance in the statistical likelihood of accidents overall is quite low; that is, the number is very
predictable. 40 The insurer also knows statistically the overall expected costs
of those accidents and the overall expected costs of providing legal representation to its insureds. 41 Based on this information, the insurer knows how

35
See, e.g., Christopher C. French, The Role of the Profit Imperative in Risk Management, 17
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1081, 1109 (2015) (“Insurers justify their refusal to insure catastrophic risks such
as earthquakes on the basis that the losses are essentially ‘uninsurable’ because the risks of loss
are highly correlated . . . .”).
36
See J. David Cummins, Should the Government Provide Insurance for Catastrophes?, 88
FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 337, 337 (2006) (“Insurance works best for high-frequency, lowseverity events, which are statistically independent and have probability distributions that are
reasonably stationary over time.”).
37
See JUDY FELDMAN ANDERSON & ROBERT L. BROWN, EDUCATION & EXAMINATION
COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES, RISK AND INSURANCE 4 (2005) (in the case of an
automobile driver’s risk, “if we look at a particular individual, we see that there can be an extremely large variation in possible outcomes”).
38
See id.
39
See Cummins, supra note 36, at 342 (“Intuitively, the law of large numbers says that the
sample mean becomes arbitrarily close to the population mean as the sample size increases. Thus,
the expected loss is highly predictable in a sufficiently large sample.”).
40
Id. at 342–43 (“The U.S. market for personal automobile insurance is an example of a locally insurable market.”).
41
See ANDERSON & BROWN, supra note 37, at 4–5 (“[I]f an insurer sells n policies to n individuals, it assumes the total risk of n individuals. In reality, the risk assumed by the insurer is
smaller in total than the sum of the risks associated with each individual policyholder.”).
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much money it needs to collect from insureds to cover its expected losses—
the actuarially fair price. 42
In this sense, insurance is one of the world’s oldest applications of
“Big Data,” an attribute of the industry facilitated by its partial exemption
from antitrust laws specifically to allow insurance companies to gather and
share data collectively so that actuarially fair prices can be determined. 43
Because it is worth it to insureds to pay a “premium” over the actuarially
fair price to transfer the high-variance, worst-case risk of a financial wipeout to the insurer—which “smoothes” the risk by spreading it across thousands or tens of thousands of other, similarly situated insureds—both sides
of the exchange profit. 44 Thus, conventional economics predicts that insurance will emerge because rational, self-interested individuals will find it
advantageous to pay the premium, and rational, self-interested organizations
will find it profitable to enter the business. 45 And, certainly, there is ample
empirical evidence that the conventional economic explanation is predictive: by many metrics, insurance is the largest industry in the world, with
annual premium income of $3.2 trillion. 46
Storm losses, however, are different—or so claims the conventional
economic dogma. 47 Here, the variance is high(er) for both insured and insurer. 48 For insureds, the chance that their property will be affected in any
given year by, say, a hurricane, is both uncertain and rare, triggering the
well-documented tendency of many people to discount such risks via nonrational heuristics and mental biases against low-probability/high-risk
events (it won’t happen to me). 49 Thus, the market for storm insurance will
42

See id. at 2–5.
See Anthony J. Alt, Congress’ Self-Inflicted Sisyphean Task: The Insurance Industry’s
Federal Antitrust Exemption and the Insurance Industry Competition Acts of 2007 and 2009, 16
CONN. INS. L.J. 399, 418 (2010) (“The purpose of the . . . antitrust exemption was to allow for
cooperative rate-making efforts among insurance companies so that they could ‘underwrite risks
in an informed and responsible way’ . . . .”).
44
See Cummins, supra note 36, at 342 (“Individuals are averse to pure risk and are willing to
pay amounts greater than the expected value of losses in return for transferring risk to an insurer.”).
45
See id. (“The amounts greater than expected losses that individuals and businesses are willing to pay for risk transfer give rise to gains from trade that have motivated the development of the
insurance and reinsurance industries.”).
46
See Mills, supra note 1, at 1040 (“As the world’s largest industry, the [insurance industry]
would be the third largest country if its $3.2 trillion in yearly revenues were compared with national gross domestic products . . . .”).
47
See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 605–10 (1992) (collecting typologies and sources
of these types of mental errors).
48
See id.
49
See id.
43
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be less vigorous than for risks that are viewed as more routine.50 Data on
penetration rates of hurricane insurance in the United States bear this out.51
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, evidence indicates that approximately 40% of those suffering losses had failed to purchase adequate—or any—
flood insurance. 52
But it is also the case that storm losses are different even for statistically-minded insurers, who do not themselves rush to offer storm insurance.
One reason is that, from a Big Data perspective, the methodologies for calculating future storm losses are more fraught than mining data for common
events such as automobile accidents. For example, in hurricane-insurance
rate setting at both the federal and state levels, it was customary to project
future losses by using a simple historical baseline, going back twenty or
thirty years, to obtain average losses that were assumed to represent the
likely outcome in the near future. 53 The failure of this approach to reflect
real-world changes in both the value of insured properties (more recent extensive and expensive development at the coast) and changes in hurricane
frequency or intensity was captured in 1992 when Hurricane Andrew
caused the insolvencies of ten Florida insurers and led to years of rapid rate
increases, insurer abandonment of coastal insurance altogether, or both.54
Although insurers and regulators began using more long-term climatology
models to capture a bigger statistical picture, Hurricane Katrina’s $45 billion in insured losses in 2005 still exceeded the losses that those models had

50
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-7, NATURAL DISASTERS: PUBLIC
POLICY OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE FEDERAL ROLE IN NATIONAL CATASTROPHE INSURANCE
25 (2007) (describing how of 60,196 homes with severe wind damage from hurricanes in 2005,
38% did not have insurance against wind loss); Dwight Jaffee et al., Long Term Insurance (LTI)
for Addressing Catastrophe Risk 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14210,
2008) (considering both wind and flood insurance, 41% of damaged homes from the 2005 hurricanes in the United States were uninsured or underinsured).
51
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 50, at 25; James A. Knox Jr., Causation, the Flood Exclusion, and Katrina, 41 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 901, 911 (2006);
Jaffee et al., supra note 50, at 4. Of the NFIP-eligible homes in the New Orleans area, only 30%
had flood insurance. Knox, supra.
52
See Knox, supra note 51, at 911.
53
See Sarah M. Tran, Updated Hurricane Models: A New Opportunity to Insure Against
Climate Change, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH L. 73, 85 (2008) (“Under the traditional approach . . .
regulators determine what they consider to be reasonable rates for a given exposure by averaging
annual statewide loss data over approximately twenty to thirty years.”).
54
See Hornstein, supra note 3, at 25 (noting that between 2001 and 2006, rates for homeowners’ insurance in Florida rose 77%); Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance and Catastrophe in the
Case of Katrina and Beyond, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 49, 52–53 (2006–2007) (discussing Florida
insolvencies); see also Tran, supra note 53, at 86 (“[T]he shortcomings of using historical premium and loss experience with respect to catastrophes like hurricanes are clear.”).
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predicted. 55 In turn, this has led to the use of statistical models that are more
sensitive to very recent changes in coastal property valuations as well as to
meteorological trends, such as El Niño events or climate change, that can
make future weather different from the past. 56 Most insurers outsource this
element of Big Data to private modeling consultants such as Risk Management Solutions (“RMS”) or AIR Worldwide (“AIR”) who use propriety
models that carry with them their own complications: skepticism by ratepayers and insurance regulators, as well as their uncertain effect on ratings
by agencies such as A.M. Best, Fitch, and Standard & Poor’s on which insurers depend for access to capital. 57
Finally, even if actual hurricane losses could be reliably predicted, it can
be difficult for insurers to smooth them across insurance pools, thus avoiding
unexpected losses and potential insolvency. First, because storm losses occur
across entire neighborhoods and regions, the losses are neither randomized
nor independent, but instead are “correlated” losses requiring payoffs all at
once and therefore posing particular threats to insurers’ capital.58 Second, because insurance is typically offered, and regulated, intra-state, there can be
geographic limitations to the insurance pools across which insurers can
spread their correlated losses. 59 As importantly, the local nature of insurance
regulation makes state insurance commissioners, who regulate the rates insurers can charge for storm risks, subject to political pressure from voters whose
cognitive dissonance predisposes them to downplay storm risks in the first
55

Tran, supra note 53, at 88.
See Carolyn Kousky & Roger M. Cooke, The Unholy Trinity: Fat Tails, Tail Dependence,
and Micro-Correlations 1 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 09-36-REV, Nov. 9, 2009),
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-09-36-REV.pdf [https://perma.
cc/YNW8-UMMV] (standard diversification approaches to risk can fail “when loss distributions are
characterized by fat tails, tail dependence, or micro-correlations”).
57
Tran, supra note 53, at 88 (“The closed nature of these models could potentially impede
regulators’ ability to determine the reasonableness of the filed rates.”); see, e.g., ILL. DEP’T OF
INS., FINDING A REPUTABLE INSURANCE COMPANY: USING FINANCIAL RATING AGENCIES 1
(2009) (urging consumers to use financial visibility data compiled on insurers by such ratings
agencies as A.M. Best, Fitch, and Standard & Poor’s); Chad Hemenway, Cat Modeling: Ingrained
in the Industry, Embroiled in Controversy, PROPERTY CASUALTY 360° (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.
propertycasualty360.com/2011/03/18/cat-modeling-ingrained-in-the-industry-embroiled-i (noting
that the 2011 RMS model increased hurricane risks almost overnight by 150 percent); see also
Karen Clark, How Can Rating Agencies Better Gauge Carrier Cat-Risk Exposure?, PROPERTY
CASUALTY 360° (May 16, 2011), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2011/05/16/how-can-ratingagencies-better-gauge-carrier-cat- (“The rating agencies are not making consistent comparisons
across companies with respect to catastrophe risk.”).
58
See Cummins, supra note 36, at 343 (“If risks are dependent, the amount of equity capital
needed per risk to achieve a given insolvency target becomes [greater] . . . .”).
59
See Alt, supra note 43, at 400–02 (explaining how the federal 1946 McCarran-Ferguson
Act makes “the business of insurance” the province of state, not federal, regulation).
56
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place, and who will criticize insurers’ arguments for rate increases to the extent that they are based upon proprietary risk data given to them by consultants such as AIR or RMS, data that is not particularly transparent.60 Insurers
routinely cite all of these reasons—the standard economic dogma—when
they claim that storm risks are “uninsurable.”61 And, empirically, insurers do
seem to put their money where their mouth is. Since 1968, insurers in the
United States have in fact excluded flood losses from standardized coverage. 62 In the section below, I turn to wind.
III. WIND INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHEASTERN
AND GULF STATES
A. The State of the Private Market
If there is a private market for wind insurance in the Southeastern and
Gulf states, most large private insurers want little part of it. Since 2004, Allstate Insurance (the “good hands” people) has dropped approximately
320,000 policies with wind exposure in Florida, 12,000 policies in South
Carolina, and announced that it would not write new policies in Maryland and
Virginia. 63 In 2009, Nationwide Insurance (“on your side”) dropped 60,000
coastal properties in Florida. 64 In 2008, Farmers Insurance (“Insurance University”) threatened to leave North Carolina markets altogether rather than be
forced to participate in the state’s coverage of coastal wind risks, and in
2011–2012, the Farm Bureau of North Carolina followed suit by significantly
reducing its residential wind writings at the coast. 65 Even those insurers who
remain increasingly offer “hollow[ed] out” coverage with higher deductibles
and co-payments and lower overall policy limits, thereby effectively forcing

60

See Tran, supra note 53, at 88 (“[S]ome consumer advocates fear that insurance companies
could use the proprietary nature of the models to raise rates unscrupulously.”).
61
See, e.g., French, supra note 35, at 1109 (insurers claim catastrophic risks are uninsurable).
62
See Hornstein, supra note 3, at 13–14.
63
See ENVTL. DEF., BLOWN AWAY: HOW GLOBAL WARMING IS ERODING THE AVAILABILITY
OF INSURANCE COVERAGE IN AMERICA’S COASTAL CITIES 17 (2007), http://emerginglitigation.
shb.com/Portals/f81bfc4f-cc59-46fe-9ed5-7795e6eea5b5/7301_BlownAway_insurancereport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CVQ9-R29V]; Amy Clark, Allstate’s ‘Good Hands’ Wave ‘Bye Bye,’ CBS NEWS
(Dec. 21, 2006, 6:25 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/allstates-good-hands-wave-bye-bye/ [https://
perma.cc/K6TA-UWAK].
64
See Jeff Harrington, Insurer to Drop 60,000, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009, at 1B.
65
See Michael Adams, North Carolina Farm Bureau to Raise Homeowners’ Rates, Drop
Policies, INS. J. (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2012/02/27/
237291.htm [https://perma.cc/3VCV-DYYG]; Brian H. Kern, Farmers Insurance to Pull Out of
North Carolina Homeowners’ Market, INS. J. (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/southeast/2008/08/14/92787.htm [https://perma.cc/R46M-2N6U].
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insureds to pay more for less. 66 In Florida, when an unprecedented sequence
of four hurricanes swept the state in 2004, those who had insurance bore between fifteen and twenty percent of the financial losses.67
B. The Rise of Quasi-Public State Residual-Risk Wind Pools
In the place of an effective private market, there has arisen a political
market for governmental action. Mindful of the fact that 53% of the U.S.
population lives at or near coastal areas (voters), politically mindful coastal
states have created public programs known generically either as “FAIR”
plans (“Fair Access to Insurance Requirements”), Joint Underwriting Associations, or Wind Pools. 68 In 2002, Florida created the Citizens Property
Insurance Corporation. 69 In 2003, Louisiana created the Louisiana Citizens
Property Insurance Association. 70 Texas has created the Texas Windstorm
Insurance Association, Mississippi the Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting
Authority, and South Carolina its Wind and Hail Underwriting Association. 71 These plans, and others, typically reflect the structure of “residual”
or “assigned risk” pools in which the state conditions the right to sell insurance in the state with (forced) participation in these high-risk pools. 72 Although the constitutionality of such structures has been questioned by some,
including Professor Richard Epstein, state courts have rejected challenges
that the arrangements constitute takings requiring compensation under the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and have
similarly rejected challenges that the arrangements violate substantive due
66

See J. ROBERT HUNTER, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY’S INCREDIBLE DISAPPEARING WEATHER CATASTROPHE RISK: HOW INSURERS HAVE SHIFTED RISK AND
COST ASSOCIATED WITH WEATHER CATASTROPHES TO CONSUMERS AND TAXPAYERS 1–4 (2012),

http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/InsuranceRegulationHurricaneRiskDisappearingCoverageStudy
2-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6ES-SF3Q].
67
See EVAN MILLS ET AL., CERES, AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF INSURANCE UNDER
CLIMATE CHANGE: A GROWING CHALLENGE FOR THE U.S. 5 (2005), http://www.c2es.org/doc
Uploads/Ceres%20--%20Insurance%20&%20Climate%20Change%202005.pdf [https://perma.cc/
SFS6-4ECG].
68
AM. INS. ASS’N, WHAT ARE “RESIDUAL MARKETS” FOR PROPERTY INSURANCE? (n.d.),
http://www.aiadc.org/File%20Library/Resources/Industry%20Resources/PROPERTY---National---Residual-Market-Descriptions-White-Paper-295953.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7KP-5JNM]; KRISTEN
M. CROSSETT ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., POPULATION TRENDS ALONG THE
COASTAL UNITED STATES: 1980–2008, at 1 (2004), http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/programs/mb/
pdfs/coastal_pop_trends_complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3H3-YGVT].
69
See FLA. STAT. § 627.351(6) (2015).
70
See LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:2293 (2015).
71
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-34-3 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-90-810 to -890 (2015);
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 2210.001 to .705 (West 2015).
72
See generally TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 624–34 (3d
ed. 2013) (describing generally the structure of residual risk insurance programs).
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process. 73 Initially created as “insurers of last resort” for homeowners who
could not find affordable (or any) private coverage, these programs soon
came to dominate the market for wind insurance in Southeastern and Gulf
states. Florida Citizens had, by 2007, become Florida’s largest insurer of
first resort and the fourth-largest property insurer in the nation. 74 The North
Carolina Coastal Property Insurance Pool covers approximately 70% of the
State’s beach properties. 75 Nationally, compared to $55 billion in insured

73
See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. State, 590 A.2d 191, 207 (N.J. 1991) (“Since we hold
that the [arrangement in question] does not, on its face, impose a confiscatory taking, a fortiori we
find that it meets the minimal requirements for constitutionality under a substantive due process
analysis.”); id. at 198–99 (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934)) (“[T]he guaranty of due process . . . demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to
be attained.”); see also Country-Wide Ins. Co. v. Harnett, 426 F. Supp. 1030, 1035 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) aff’d 431 U.S. 934 (“Regulation of the insurance industry, in order to provide adequate
protection of the public, is surely a proper subject for the state’s exercise of its police power . . . .
The law accomplishes a legitimate public goal and any contract right must yield to it.”); People ex
rel. Lewis v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 414 N.Y.S.2d 823, 829 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (“[I]t is, therefore, unnecessary to determine the further issue of whether the Superintendent’s application of
[the laws at issue] has crossed the threshold of appropriating the defendants’ property without just
compensation . . . .”); Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights and Insurance Regulation: From Federalism to Takings, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 293, 298 (1999); Steven Plitt & Daniel Maldonado, When
Constitutional Challenges to State Cancellation Moratoriums Enacted After Catastrophic Hurricanes Fail: A Call for a New Federal Insurance Program, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 41, 64 (2012) (“Insurance companies can also argue that any statutory or regulatory scheme which precludes an
insurance company from allocating the company’s resources as it sees fit, forcing it to suffer net
economic losses both within and outside the Gulf states, results in a taking of its “property” without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment . . . . Any showing that beneficial use
has been denied will fail because any “compelled” insurance contract would still belong to the
insurer and policyholders would still pay the insurance company all required premiums.”).
74
Tom Zucco & Jennifer Liberto, Citizens’ Business Booms, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 26,
2007), http://www.sptimes.com/2007/06/26/Business/Citizens__business_bo.shtml [https://perma.
cc/7ZFN-KE5C] (“Citizens currently has about 1.3-million homeowner policies, and its commercial business is growing by 1,000 percent this year. That makes Citizens the fourth-largest property insurer in the nation.”); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.351(2)(b)(5)(b) (2015) (“It is the intent of
the Legislature that the rates for coverage provided by the association be actuarially sound and not
competitive with approved rates charged in the admitted voluntary market such that the association functions as a residual market mechanism to provide insurance only when the insurance cannot be procured in the voluntary market.”); see Jean Gruss, The Insurer of First Resort, BUS. OBSERVER (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.businessobserverfl.com/section/detail/the-insurer-of-first-resort/
[https://perma.cc/U9AC-CSUD] (“When it was created after Andrew, Citizens was supposed to be
the insurer of last resort . . . . Today, the state-owned agency has become the largest residentialproperty insurer in Florida . . . .”).
75
LRC COMM. ON PROP. INS. RATE MAKING, MINUTES: NOVEMBER 2, 2011, at 8 (2011), http://
www.ncga.state.nc.us/DocumentSites/Committees/PIRMC/2011-November%2002/Approved%20
Minutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/DRU9-Z9P2].
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assets in such plans in 1990, state-run residual risk plans had by 2012 over
$880 billion in loss exposure, an increase of 1517 percent. 76
IV. HOW STATE WIND POOLS ARE FINANCED
Not all state residual programs are structured identically, and many of
them are still undergoing periods of significant experimentation and revision. The merits of these programs are difficult to evaluate in a vacuum.
Even though “market-making” institutions in general may be lauded as creative ways in which government can interact with markets, in the case of
these particular residual-market insurance mechanisms, their link to actual
public-welfare improvements depends on the details.
This Section analyzes three such programs: those adopted in North
Carolina, Texas, and Florida. The North Carolina Coastal Property Insurance Pool reflects an approach that, having undergone significant legislative
reform in 2009, utilizes a pay-it-forward financial structure designed to
have in place, at the beginning of each new hurricane season, financial coverage in the event of a 1-in-100-year probable-maximum-loss (“PML”), the
standard target for catastrophic insurance used by private insurers in the
United States. 77 The Texas Windstorm Insurance Association reflects a different financial strategy, one that depends mostly on the Association’s ability to float post-event bonding in the event of a catastrophe. 78 And the Florida Citizens Property Insurance Association reflects an entity that in some
ways has been the most experimental of all wind pools. At times, it covers
excess risk with both post-event financing and use of a uniquely Floridian
in-state reinsurance facility, and more recently by use of the most aggressive depopulation, or “take-out” program, in the country, seeking to encourage and even subsidize the emergence of a new type of private insurance
market for catastrophic-wind risk, and to shed policies into it. 79

76

ROBERT P. HARTWIG & CLAIRE WILKINSON, INS. INFO. INST., RESIDUAL MARKET PROPERTY
PLANS: FROM MARKETS OF LAST RESORT TO MARKETS OF FIRST CHOICE 3 (2014), http://www.
iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/paper_residualmarketupdate_2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W6R5BLLG].
77
See generally N.C. INS. UNDERWRITING ASS’N, COASTAL PROPERTY INSURANCE POOL:
MANUAL OF RULES AND PROCEDURES (2015), http://www.ncjua-nciua.org/DocLib/Operational
Docs/CPIP_MOR.pdf [https://perma.cc/DKG9-PBUN] (detailing guidelines for the NCIUA); see
also KAREN CLARK & CO., supra note 29, at 1 (noting that the 1-in-100-year PML is the insurance
industry’s standard, but that it may nonetheless significantly understate the true financial risks of
catastrophic weather).
78
See infra notes 147–170 and accompanying text.
79
See infra notes 171–203 and accompanying text.
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A. The North Carolina Insurance Underwriting Association
Created by the North Carolina General Assembly in 1969, the North
Carolina Insurance Underwriting Association (“NCIUA” or the “Association”) is not a state agency. 80 Instead, it is a nonprofit entity tasked with
providing “as an insurer of last resort” property insurance (including wind
coverage) for residential and commercial properties on North Carolina’s
Barrier Islands and on the most exposed parts of the State’s coastal counties. 81 Half of the NCIUA’s board of directors are elected by the insurance
industry with the other half appointed by the state insurance commissioner
from among independent insurance agents or the public. 82 The NCIUA does
not set insurance rates for coverage, a task in North Carolina that belongs to
the N.C. Insurance Commissioner and the N.C. Rate Bureau. 83 Participation
in the NCIUA is mandatory for all insurers offering property insurance anywhere in the state, regardless of whether they write coverage at the coast.84
But participation in annual profits and losses from coastal coverage reflected each insurer’s pro rata share of the overall state market. 85 Thus, in the
case of a $10 million overall loss in coastal coverage (a stormy year), a
company with a 5% market share of the overall state property insurance
market would be given an “assessment,” requiring it to reimburse the NCIUA $500,000 (5% of the overall loss). Until 2009, insurers would also similarly share in profitable years, dividing underwriting profits in quiet years
(few storms). 86 The Association’s books were settled annually, with assessments or disbursements based on a designated, prior “storm” year (e.g., the
Association’s accounts for 2006 would be settled for storms occurring in
calendar year 2001), allowing a sufficient lag time to reflect all disbursements and final accountings for losses in the storm year, and to allow the
Association to carry forward enough retained earnings to operate in the upcoming year. 87 There were provisions to incentivize insurers to write coverage directly on coastal properties by giving them “credit” against any annu80

See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-45-10 (2015) (creating the NCIUA).
See id.
82
See N.C. INS. UNDERWRITING ASS’N, PLAN OF OPERATION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA INSURANCE UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION 13–14 (2015), http://www.ncjua-nciua.org/DocLib/Operational
Docs/CPIP_PO.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSF2-MGM2].
83
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-45-15; see also N.C. INS. UNDERWRITING ASS’N, supra note 82,
at 8 (showing how rates are calculated).
84
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-45-10.
85
See id. § 58-45-25(a).
86
See id.
87
See id. § 58-36-10(3) (“In the case of property insurance rates under this Article, consideration may be given to the experience of property insurance business during the most recent fiveyear period for which that experience is available.”).
81
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al assessments they owed as members of the Association for properties they
insured directly as individual insurers.88 This was not unimportant, as there
was no limit to the amount of overall losses for which members could be
assessed. 89 Thus, in the event of a $1 billion loss, an insurer with a
statewide 5% market share could be assessed $50 million. The ability of
insurers to immediately pass on this assessment to policyholders statewide
was not assured, and required approval of the (elected) state insurance
commissioner. 90
Prior to significant legislative redesign in 2009, Figure 1 91 below illustrates the NCIUA’s financial structure—what regulators and insurers refer
to as its “tower” —for financing storm losses in calendar year 2008, the last
year before new legislation took effect.

88

See id. § 58-45-25(b).
See id. § 58-45-25(a) (“Each member of the Association shall participate in the expenses,
profits, and losses of the Association in the proportion that its net direct premium written in this
State during the preceding calendar year for residential and commercial properties outside of the
beach and coastal areas bears to the aggregate net direct premiums written in this State during the
preceding calendar year for residential and commercial properties outside of the beach and coastal
areas by all members of the Association, as certified to the Association by the Commissioner.”)
(emphasis added).
90
See id. § 58-45-25(b).
91
Email from Alvin Ashworth, NCIUA Director of Finance and Accounting, to author (Apr.
10, 2014) (on file with author).
89
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Figure 1—NCIUA Financing Tower, 2008

There are three features of Figure 1 that are noteworthy. First, there are
problems with the “top” of the tower. NCIUA financing projected funds
capable of covering an annual loss of only $2.4 billion, a loss predicted to
occur once every 49 years.92 In contrast, the industry norm is (and was then)
to have in place financing for a one-in-one-hundred-year storm (known as
“probable maximum loss” or the “100-year PML”). 93 Although, as previously mentioned, there was no statutory limit on the ability of the Association to impose assessments on member companies in the event of storm
losses beyond the 1-in-49-year PML, it is revealing that the member com-

92

See North Carolina House, Senate Agree on Beach Plan Insurance Bill, INS. J. (Aug. 6, 2009),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2009/08/06/102828.htm [https://perma.cc/3Y4GWLZD]; see also Chad Hemenway, N.C. Beach Plan Reform Bill Advances in House; Assessment
Concerns Remain, INSURANCENEWSNET.COM: PROPERTY & CASUALTY NEWS (July 15, 2009, 3:09
PM),
https://insurancenewsnet.com/oarticle/NC-Beach-Plan-Reform-Bill-Advances-in-HouseAssessment-Concerns-Remain-a-108045 [https://perma.cc/9LPM-YHCK] (“[T]he Beach Plan is
responsible for financing the payment of losses that exceed the total from surplus . . . and reinsurance (currently about $2.4 billion.”).
93
KAREN CLARK & CO., supra note 29, at 1 (“Insurers typically manage their potential catastrophe losses to the 100-year PMLs . . . .”).
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panies refused to specifically demarcate that possibility on the NCIUA’s
2008 financing plan. 94
Second, there is weakness, or at least ambiguity, in the “bottom” of
the tower. 95 The bottom of the tower reflects financing for the first $1.1 billion in losses, amounts of loss that were the most likely to occur. 96 Yet the
tower does not identify any concrete dollar amount of retained earnings that
were available (effectively in cash) to handle these losses.97 Rather, the bottom and the left side of the tower reflects the Association’s ability to obtain
money from member companies, if needed, by “assessments.” Although
there were certainly several hundreds of millions of dollars in retained earnings that the Association would have on hand going into calendar year 2008
to cover losses, it is revealing that the financing tower does not specify precisely how much money the Association carried over into 2008 (and therefore didn’t take out as underwriting profit in 2007 to distribute among
member companies) and how much it attributed to its ability to raise by assessment, if needed. 98 This reflects the possibility that, even as to a 1-in-49year PML, the Association could have faced a short-term liquidity problem
after a catastrophe. 99
Third, there is both strength and weakness in the tower’s middle layers. 100 On the positive side, the middle layers of the Association’s tower
reflect the Association’s use of reinsurance which, generally speaking, is an
increasingly common and acceptable way of advance financing for contingent risks. 101 Just to illustrate the general points made earlier in the Article,
in the second layer, one can see that the Association had negotiated and prepaid for a reinsurer who would cover a layer of $300 million by providing
“80% of $300 million” ($240 million in coverage) that would be made
available once the Association had experienced a single storm event causing

94
See Figure 1. Figures 1–8 in this Article can be found at http://ealr.bclawreview.org/files/
2016/05/hornstein-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GWP-QFPG].
95
See id.
96
See id.
97
See id.
98
See Kern, supra note 65 (“North Carolina’s hurricane assessment process kicks-in if losses
exceed the system’s financial capability . . . , insurers are assessed based on the percentage of
homeowners business they have in the state and the amount of writing along the coast . . . .”).
99
See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, INSURANCE INDUSTRY CATASTROPHE MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES 12 (2001), https://www.actuary.org/files/catmonograph_june01.4.pdf/catmonograph_
june01.4.pdf [https://perma.cc/XT5M-XVG3] (“Generally, the liquidity (or illiquidity) of an insurer after a catastrophe does not cause insolvency . . . . It is the magnitude of the event and the
fact that the company does not have sufficient surplus to pay claims that is the defining factor.”).
100
See Figure 1, supra note 94.
101
See id.
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$1.1 billion in damage. 102 Hence the nomenclature “xs $1.1 billion” (in excess of $1.1 billion). 103
But, on the weakness side, this $300 million layer would also require
$60 million in assessments against member companies, as reflected in the
left-hand side of the tower’s second layer.104 Put another way, rather than
pay forward for coverage for the entire layer, the Association was promising
to pay later, via assessments, if and when such losses came to pass; a strategy, one notices, that is repeated in layers 3 and 4 as one moves up the tower. 105 Finally, although most observers might not notice it, the reinsurance
layers of the tower have single “attachment” points. 106 For example, the
second layer reflects a reinsurance contract that requires a single storm
causing $1.1 billion in losses, after which the reinsurer’s obligations for
additional losses from that storm become triggered (the attachment
point). 107 Not apparent from such an arrangement is that, once activated by
the single storm, the reinsurance obligation does not “reset” and become
available for losses that might be caused by a second (or third or fourth)
serious storm during that storm season. 108 Considering that the 2004 storm
season featured a record-breaking four named hurricanes that scoured Florida in a single year, it is noteworthy that the Association provided effectively no “aggregate” coverage in the middle layers to guard against the same
thing happening in North Carolina in its then-upcoming season. 109
North Carolina’s 2008 financing tower is an excellent reference point
to highlight public policy changes that occurred in North Carolina in 2009.
To begin, it is revealing that, despite the weaknesses in storm-loss protection already evidenced in the NCIUA’s financing structure, there was little
102

See id.
See id.
104
See id.
105
See id.
106
See id.; Glossary of Reinsurance Terms, CAPTIVE.COM, http://www.captive.com/news/news
stand/articles/glossary-of-reinsurance-terms [https://perma.cc/ANQ3-M6Z2] (defining attachment
point as the “dollar amount under an excess of loss reinsurance contract at which a ceding (primary)
insurer’s retention requirements have been met, and the point at which the reinsurance will respond
to a loss”).
107
See Figure 1, supra note 94.
108
See MUNICH RE, REINSURANCE: A BASIC GUIDE TO FACULTATIVE AND TREATY REINSURANCE 25 (2010), https://www.munichre.com/site/mram/get/documents_E96160999/mram/asset
pool.mr_america/PDFs/3_Publications/reinsurance_basic_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR4S-PDTQ]
(describing how “per occurrence” excess of loss reinsurance covers “losses arising from a single
major natural disaster,” but “aggregate” stop-loss excess reinsurance provides reinsurance “for
losses incurred during the treaty term, usually one year, in excess of . . . a predetermined dollar
amount”).
109
See id.
103

2016]

Lessons from U.S. Coastal Wind Pools About Climate Finance and Politics

365

evidence of public concern before 2008. 110 There were no political hearings,
no corrective legislation, and no media stories about North Carolina’s relatively soft financial precautions against massive storm losses. Given the
financial devastation caused by the four-hurricane season in Florida in
2004, and the even-larger financial devastation caused in Louisiana and the
Gulf states by Hurricane Katrina in 2005, this is, in itself, noteworthy. 111
Although the point is perhaps too obvious to state, the situation in North
Carolina reflected a remarkable political ambivalence toward future costs
and possible worst-case scenarios. 112
Ironically, it was insurers’ non-ambivalence toward these same risks
that finally got the state’s attention. In 2008, precisely because of the nation’s massive storm losses in 2004 and 2005, Farmers Insurance notified
the state insurance commissioner that it was preparing to leave North Carolina entirely rather than participate further in the NCIUA. 113 From Farmers’
perspective, and despite the representations in the NCIUA’s financing tower, the Association had the legal power, and indeed the obligation, to impose
on all property insurers in the state, a potentially limitless assessment
should a huge storm cause massive property losses on the North Carolina
coast. 114 Insurers found it difficult to plan for the financing of these uncertain assessments. 115 Because a massive cash-flow problem could threaten its
profitability, its obligations to shareholders, or even its solvency, Farmers
110

See, e.g., ELI LEHRER, JOHN LOCKE FOUND., NORTH CAROLINA’S BEACH PLAN: WHO PAYS
COASTAL PROPERTY INSURANCE? 5 (2008) http://www.johnlocke.org/acrobat/policyReports/
beach_plan_reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/683T-HT9F] (starting to sound an alarm about coastal
insurance in North Carolina in 2008 but referring to the “Beach Plan” as otherwise “little-known”).
111
See Ann Green, Storm Surge: Lessons from Katrina, COASTWATCH, Autumn 2006, https://
ncseagrant.ncsu.edu/coastwatch/previous-issues/2006-2/autumn-2006/storm-surge-lessons-fromkatrina/ [https://perma.cc/PB2C-YFBG] (“No one knows how North Carolina would fare if a
devastating storm like Katrina hit. However, the state has one of the oldest hurricane construction
codes in the country, first implemented in the 1960s and improved over time . . . [and] ‘[t]here is a
low probability that North Carolina will get a storm with the water level as high as it was during
Katrina . . . .’”) (quoting Spencer Rogers, a civil engineer).
112
See id.
113
See Kern, supra note 65.
114
See id. (quoting Jack Hannigan, Farmers Senior Vice President and Chief Marketing Officer as informing agents and policyholders that “Farmers regrets having to non-renew our homeowners’ customers, but the current hurricane assessment process has forced us to make this difficult business decision”).
115
See N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, JOINT SELECT STUDY COMMITTEE ON THE POTENTIAL IMPACT
OF MAJOR HURRICANES ON THE NORTH CAROLINA INSURANCE INDUSTRY: REPORT TO THE 2009
SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 9 (n.d.), http://ncleg.net/Library/studies/2009/nr35.pdf
[https://perma.cc/89T3-B8FL] (citing Mr. Bradley Lemons, Nationwide Insurance, as noting that
“the current system does not allow for any predictability in the amount of assessments and the
inability to plan for a maximum assessment makes it difficult and expensive for insurers to purchase their own reinsurance in the private market”).
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made a credible threat to leave the state.116 Moreover, because the threat
was credible, it quickly amplified into a politically salient issue.117 As, under the Association’s structure, storm assessments were made on a marketshare basis, Farmers’ departure would magnify the market share of the
state’s remaining insurers and amplify the assessments to which they were
exposed. 118 Other insurers intimated that they, too, would consider leaving
the state entirely. 119 The state insurance commissioner recognized this as a
“ticking time bomb,” and the General Assembly created a study commission to consider statutory changes. 120
By 2009, the study commission had finished its work and the General
Assembly had statutorily revised both the NCIUA and a related association,
the North Carolina Joint Underwriters Association (or “FAIR Plan”), which
covered noncoastal properties. 121 At the coast, the NCIUA was to administer the North Carolina Coastal Property Insurance Pool (the “Wind Pool”) to
which the legislature made four especially important changes. 122 First,
member companies would no longer be able to withdraw “surplus” each
year from underwriting profits the Wind Pool might record during relatively
quiet, non-stormy years. 123 Rather, premiums would be carried over as retained earnings that, over time, could accumulate to cover the first layer of
storm costs in future years. 124 Depending on the details of their structures,
the IRS increasingly took the position that, unlike the case with private in116

See DONALD L. GRIFFIN, PROP. CASUALTY INS. ASS’N OF AM., PCI STATEMENT REGARDING PROPERTY INSURANCE RATEMAKING IN NORTH CAROLINA 3–4 (2011), http://www.ncleg.net/

DocumentSites/Committees/PIRMC/2011-December%201/PCI_Don%20Griffin.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Z5EW-5PSH] (“[A]n internal audit of the Beach Plan found that deficits could threaten the plan’s
ability to pay claims, bankrupt small insurers and force carriers out of the North Carolina marketplace . . . . Indeed, significant assessments did cause some private insurers to non-renew many of
their policies in the state and stop writing new policies.”).
117
See LEHRER, supra note 110, at 5 (quoting North Carolina Insurance Commissioner-Elect
Wayne Goodwin stating that, “North Carolina’s Beach Plan is a Ticking Time Bomb”).
118
See GRIFFIN, supra note 116, at 3 (“Since private insurers in North Carolina are statutory
required to support the Beach Plan through rate subsidies and assessments, [the consulting firm]
Milliman determined that a large event could easily result in insurance company assessments of
approximately $6.2 billion, while medium and small events could create assessments of $2.9 billion and $1.4 billion, respectively.”).
119
See LEHRER, supra note 110, at 7 (“Speaking with the author on a not-for-attribution basis,
representatives of two other sizeable insurers confirmed that they had developed plans to leave the
North Carolina market if conditions warranted.”).
120
See supra notes 110, 117 and accompanying text.
121
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-45 (2015).
122
See id.; see also id. § 58-45-1(a) (2014) (“It is hereby declared by the General Assembly
of North Carolina that an adequate market for essential property insurance is necessary to the
economic welfare of the beach and coastal areas of the State of North Carolina. . . . ”).
123
See id. § 58-45-25(b1).
124
See id.
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surers, retained earnings from some residual risk organizations such as the
Wind Pool are not taxable but instead are allowed to accumulate tax free to
pay for losses on the inevitable rainy day. 125 Moreover, as retained earnings
grew during the quiet years, it elevated the attachment point at which reinsurance would be needed, thus lowering reinsurers’ risks and accordingly
the prices of reinsurance. 126
Second, in exchange for member companies no longer able to profittake during quiet years, the overall assessment during non-quiet years, for
which the industry as a whole would be responsible, was capped at $1 billion (still to be shouldered by individual companies by their particular market share in the statewide property insurance market, the expenses for which
are taken into consideration by the insurance commissioner when rates are
set). Third, at the top of the tower, the Wind Pool was expected to create a
financing structure accounting for losses that might be incurred in a severe
storm season at the 100-year PML level. 127 And, fourth, in the event of costs
beyond the 100-year PML level, the state’s insurance commissioner was
allowed to impose a “catastrophe recovery charge” on policyholders
statewide, capped at a 10% annual surcharge on the cost of an insured’s
property coverage. 128
To appreciate the difference made by these statutory changes to North
Carolina’s storm-risk financing strategy, Figure 2 129 shows the Wind Pool’s
financing tower for calendar year 2012:

125
See generally JAMES W. NEWMAN, JR., FLA. CATASTROPHIC RISK MGMT. CTR., FLA. ST. U.,
INSURANCE RESIDUAL MARKETS: HISTORICAL AND PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVES 54–60 (2010),
http://stormrisk.org/sites/default/files/Insurance%20Residual%20Markets%20White%20Paper%20-%
207-22-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RYT-DZUX] (recounting IRS letter rulings and policies regarding residual-entity tax exemptions).
126
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-45-25(b2).
127
See id. § 58-45-47(a).
128
See id; see also Figure 2, supra note 94.
129
See Leslie Scism, Insurance Pool’s Coverage to Coastal Carolina Ebbs, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 14, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125288603617007331 (“The state’s
overhaul is the latest—and one of the stiffest—by hurricane-prone states to rein in exposure for
the state-created “insurers of last resort” and line up resources to pay for it . . . . [F]ew legislatures
have moved as aggressively as North Carolina’s, according to the trade groups.”).
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Figure 2—Wind Pool 2012 Financing Tower

In contrast to North Carolina’s 2008 financial strategy, the 2012 financing tower reflects a number of improvements. 130 First, the top of the
tower now matches insurance-industry best practices regarding 100-yearstorms by arranging financing up to the industry-standard 100-year PML, a
severe storm registering $3.74 billion in losses. In contrast, as the top of the
tower in Figure 1 reflects, the former North Carolina Beach Plan had accounted for financing only to the $2.4 billion costs of a 1-in-49-year
storm. 131 Second, the bottom of the tower also reflects more solid financial
footing. 132 No longer are “retained earnings” and “company assessments”
130

See Figure 2, supra note 94.
See Figure 1, supra note 94.; Figure 2, supra note 94.
132
See Figure 2, supra note 94.
131
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bundled together in an undifferentiated way, but instead retained earnings of
$600 million are registered as on-hand and ready for immediate disbursement. 133 Further, the industry’s entire $1 billion liability is treated as the
second layer to be exhausted in its entirety prior to any reinsurance, a financial strategy designed to raise the attachment point for the Pool’s first reinsurer and thereby lower the rate-on-line at which the reinsurance could be
purchased. 134 Third, the Wind Pool negotiated with its first reinsurer to provide aggregate coverage, which meant that the entire $375 million layer
would be available throughout the entire storm season to cover the accumulated costs of multiple storms, not requiring each individual storm to reach
the attachment point of $1.6 billion. 135 And, fourth, at the top of the tower,
the Wind Pool arranged for a catastrophe bond (cat bond), the Johnson Re
bond, a foray into alternative risk finance that allowed for the purchase of
coverage at a lower price than would have been charged by a reinsurer located at the same layer.136
Finally, before leaving the example of North Carolina, Figure 3 137 below reveals the Wind Pool’s 2013 financial tower, the latest nonproprietary
data currently available that reflects further improvements in the ability of a
state to arrange for storm coverage:

133

See id.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text (explaining attachment points).
135
See supra note 108 and accompanying text (explaining aggregate coverage).
136
See Véronique Bruggeman, Capital Market Instruments for Natural Catastrophe and
Terrorism Risks: A Bright Future?, 40 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10,136, 10,141 (2010) (“[C]at bonds have
a moderating effect on reinsurance prices and prevent reinsurance prices from increasing any
faster than they did.”); Thomas Berghman, Note, A Market Under(Writing) the Weather: A Recommendation to Increase Insurer Capacity, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 221, 250 (2013) (“The issuing of
a cat bond starts with the creation of a unique type of reinsurer called a special purpose vehicle
(SPV) . . . . The primary reinsurer’s contract is backed up by the SPV through the issuance of the
cat bond.”).
137
Email from Alvin Ashworth, NCIUA Director of Finance and Accounting, to author (Mar.
31, 2016) (on file with author)
134
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worldwide in 2013. 138 Its position relatively low in the tower (at least compared to the Wind Pool’s previous Johnson Re cat bond) reflects the Wind
Pool’s concern that reinsurers were not sufficiently competitive in their rate
quotes given that 2012 was a relatively quiet year for storms in the United
States. 139 By arranging for capital-market financing relatively low in the
tower, the Wind Pool sent a market signal to reinsurers that alternative risk
transfer was, in fact, a viable alternative to traditional reinsurance. 140 Third,
the market signal was apparently received by traditional reinsurers. As in
2013, one notices that at two layers of reinsurance (just below and just
above the cat bond), the Wind Pool was able to acquire aggregate reinsurance coverage, as opposed to only one such layer in 2012. 141 Altogether, in
2013, the North Carolina Wind Pool continued its financial strategy of arranging coverage ahead of time, through retained earnings, member assessments, cat bonds, and reinsurance for a 100-year PML coastal event. 142
It is worth contrasting, although in much less detail, North Carolina’s
storm-financing strategy with alternative strategies followed in two of the
highest-risk Gulf or Southeastern states, Texas and Florida. Each of these
states is considered at high risk for storm damage partly because both states
have been located within many historical storm tracks and partly because
each of these states has significant property valuations in harm’s way. 143 A
point often lost in debates over the rising cost of catastrophes is that mount138

See Tar Heel Re Cat Bond Grows to $500m, Follows Trend on Lower Pricing, ARTEMIS
(Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2013/03/25/tar-heel-re-cat-bond-grows-to-500m-followstrend-on-lower-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/D3P6-7AGG] (“The Tar Heel Re cat bond began marketing
as a $200m single tranche of notes. Market sources told us the tranche has grown and is now being
marketed, thanks to significant investor demand . . . at an expected size of $500m. That makes this
cat bond one of the largest single tranche of cat bond notes ever recorded.”).
139
See NCJUA/NCIUA Pleased with ‘Enhanced Coverage’ from Tar Heel Re Cat Bond, ARTEMIS (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2013/04/17/ncjua-nciua-pleased-with-enhancedcoverage-from-tar-heel-re-cat-bond/ [https://perma.cc/82NF-MXM4] (quoting Chi Hum of GC Securities concluding that “[a]mongst residual market entities, NCJUA/NCIUA has pioneered the optimization of traditional reinsurance and capital markets capacity to achieve a more robust program in
terms of price, trigger, and duration for the benefit of the member companies and the policyholders of
North Carolina”).
140
See id.
141
See Figure 3, supra note 94.
142
See id.
143
See Daniel S. Wilks et al., Statistical Extension of the National Hurricane Center 5-Day
Forecasts, 24 WEATHER & FORECASTING 1052, 1053 fig.1 (2009), http://journals.ametsoc.org/
doi/pdf/10.1175/2009WAF2222189.1 [https://perma.cc/37UY-SV5E] (showing storm-track probabilities of hurricanes hitting Florida and Texas); see also Andrew Freedman, Top 5 Most Vulnerable
U.S. Cities to Hurricanes, CLIMATE CENT. (June 6, 2012), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/top5-most-vulnerable-us-cities-to-hurricanes [https://perma.cc/PED2-KG6H] (describing how Florida
and Texas having three of the five most vulnerable U.S. cities based on storm track, hurricane
frequency, and populations at risk).
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ing outlays for storm damage reflect as much the value of what a storm hits,
as the growing frequency or magnitude of the storms themselves. 144 Thus,
in 2013, Florida was second in the nation in the value of insured coastal
property (the built environment), with a total of approximately $2.8 trillion
in exposed property; Texas was third, with $1.1 trillion. 145 In contrast, in
2007, the value of North Carolina’s insured coastal properties was only
$163.5 billion—reflecting the fact that North Carolina really has no major
urban areas at the coast. 146
B. The Texas Windstorm Insurance Association
In 1971, after Hurricane Celia reinforced the financial risks of storm
losses, the Texas legislature created the Texas Catastrophe Property Insurance Association, since renamed the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association (“TWIA”). 147 Perhaps no other state residual-risk organization has had
such a star-crossed recent history as TWIA—the subject of class action litigation, a special session of the state legislature, and a recent brush with receivership. 148 Although there is evidence that at least some of TWIA’s problems may have been self-inflicted, TWIA also legitimately sought to develop innovative methods of modeling post-event losses attributable to wind
that otherwise had been the subject of years of post-hurricane “wind-versuswater” litigation throughout the Southeast and Eastern states. 149 TWIA’s
144
See, e.g., HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER & ERWANN O. MICHEL-KERJAN, AT WAR WITH THE
WEATHER 3 (2009) (explaining that the key socioeconomic factors causing increased dollar losses
from hurricanes are the real-estate developments in hazard-prone areas and the increased value at
risk).
145
See Insured Property Values in Coastal States Top $10 Trillion; Florida Has Most at Risk;
Miami Ranks 2nd Among Metros, INS. J. (June 17, 2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/
magazines/features/2013/06/17/295207.htm [https://perma.cc/PG7Z-6YYU] (citing data provided
by AIR Worldwide in chart).
146
See AIR WORLDWIDE, THE COASTLINE AT RISK: 2013 UPDATE TO THE ESTIMATED INSURED
VALUE OF U.S. COASTAL PROPERTIES 4 (2013), https://www.air-worldwide.com/publications/whitepapers/documents/the-coastline-at-risk-2013 [https://perma.cc/E9RZ-QJ84].
147
Kim A. Yelkin & David T. Weber, Texas Enacts Windstorm Insurance Reforms; Will They
Be Enough?, INS. J. (July 30, 2009), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southcentral/2009/07/
30/102629.htm [https://perma.cc/G9Y5-EU2Q].
148
See Richard J. Fidei & Erin T. Siska, Top Ten Insurance Regulatory Issues and Trends of
2012, 2013 EMERGING ISSUES 6880, 6880; Michael S. Wilson, A Procedure for Segregating Damages from Wind and Flood Water, 16 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 141, 154–63, 174 (2014); see also
JOHN W. POLAK, TEX. WINDSTORM INS. ASS’N, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT CARD 8 (2015), https://
www.twia.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/TWIA-2015-Annual-Report-Card-incl-CAT-Plan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TBW5-CHP5] (“[The Department of Insurance] placed the Association under
Administrative Oversight in February 2011 . . . .”).
149
See Fidei & Siska, supra note 148, at 6880 (“TWIA was placed into receivership in February 2011 amid concerns expressed about TWIA’s claims handling and alleged administrator mis-
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innovation sadly left them strategically open to a tradition of class-action
litigation in Texas precisely because the innovation was designed to make
decisions statistically across a class of insured properties. 150 Despite these
recent controversies, TWIA is an interesting residual-risk program to evaluate because it highlights the use of policyholder assessments as a financial
tool, and in particular the use of post-event financing secured by a stream of
annual policyholder and insurer post-event assessments that was not reflected in the financial toolbox used in North Carolina.
To some extent, TWIA’s governing structure has played a role in this
choice of financing mechanism. Until very recently, TWIA’s board of directors consisted of equal numbers of insurance-industry representatives and
representatives from those first-tier counties most at risk for storm damage,
and three other members, only one of whom must reside in a non-first-tier
county. 151 Thus, even though TWIA could propose rate increases—subject
to approval by the Texas Department of Insurance only if they exceeded
five percent increases—it should surprise no one that coastal property premium rates remained systematically low and inadequate to cover anything
close to a 1-in-100-year PML event. 152 A 2011 consultant’s report indicated
that rate increases of 45% on residential property would be necessary to
cover TWIA’s exposures, and a more recent report in 2015 indicated that
rates were still 22% below actuarially-fair levels. 153 Although TWIA could
conduct and conflicts of interest.”); Wilson, supra note 148, at 154–63 (explaining TWIA’s development of statistical and engineering protocols to help attribute losses to wind). See generally
Hornstein, supra note 3, at 16–21 (recounting recent “wind versus water” post-hurricane litigation
in Southeastern courts).
150
See Wilson, supra note 148, at 167–73 (noting that in Texas there were available 18%
penalties, prejudgment interest awards, and attorneys’ fees in the 25–33% range, that drove class
action lawsuits).
151
See generally POLAK, supra note 148, at 3 (noting that recently, the Texas legislature
enacted SB 900, which will change the composition of the board by reducing the public and industry representatives from four to three, and increasing non-coastal representatives from one to
three).
152
Compare Figure 4, supra note 94 (illustrating the financials considered by TWIA in 2012),
with Figure 5, supra note 94 (revealing that, in 2012, Texas hadn't accounted for sufficient funding for the $4.9 billion loss that it estimated in 2015 would be needed for a 1-in-100-year storm
season). See also Email from Gina Schwitzgebel, Gen. Manager, NCIUA to author (Apr. 10,
2014) (on file with author) (showing that two version of TWIA's 2013–2014 financing plan, one
version showed financing for 1-in-100 year storms as “undetermined” while another version alluded to assessments against member insurance companies to obtain financing, followed by policy
surcharges on customers thereafter).
153
See ALVAREZ & MARSAL INS. ADVISORY SERVS., LLC, RESTRUCTURING OPTIONS REPORT 11 (2011), http://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/documents/twiarestructure.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A7HU-AAA4]; Josiah Neeley, Insurance Bills Could Have a Big Impact on Texas, R ST. (May 20,
2015) [hereinafter Insurance Bills], http://www.rstreet.org/op-ed/insurance-bills-could-have-a-bigimpact-on-texas/ [https://perma.cc/8WC6-XW9Q]. The improvement in Texas rate adequacy
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also set aside funds in a special Catastrophe Reserve Trust Fund, TWIA has
generally chosen to raise funds through public securities, typically offered
post-event and secured by TWIA’s ability to impose a range of assessments. 154 To illustrate, the following financial tower, Figure 4, 155 is one that
TWIA considered in 2012:
Figure 4—TWIA Proposed Financial Tower, 2012

In contrast to North Carolina’s financial strategy, there are three important features of TWIA’s tower that is represented above in two parts, the
left-hand chart being TWIA’s plan for financing the lower layers of its financial obligation to policyholders (up to $2.8 billion), and the right-hand
chart the upper layers (up to $3.15 billion and, if any funds remained, up to
could reflect the fact that TWIA can impose rate increases of 5% annually without departmental
approval, something that it has done consistently in recent years. See Josiah Neeley, TWIA Raises
Rates Ahead of Board Restructuring, R ST. (Aug. 13, 2015) [hereinafter TWIA Raises Rates],
http://www.rstreet.org/2015/08/13/twia-raises-rates-ahead-of-board-restructuring [https://perma.
cc/NTX7-VCHM] (“The 5 percent hike in premiums was approved on a 5-4 vote . . . . It is the
fifth consecutive year the board has approved a 5 percent increase.”).
154
See POLAK, supra note 148, at 28; Insurance Bills, supra note 153. See TWIA Raises
Rates, supra note 153.
155
See Email from Gina Schwitzgebel, Gen. Manager, NCIUA to author (Oct. 1, 2012) (on
file with author).
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$3.65 billion). 156 First, compared to North Carolina’s 2012 plan (Figure 2),
there is relatively little money on hand in the bottom-most layer, even including the state’s Catastrophe Reserve Trust Fund. 157 Through a combination of low premium rates and a relatively active recent series of storms, the
state had mostly spent each year what it brought in, leaving only $300 million in assets, half of North Carolina’s bottom layer, despite Texas having
much greater financial and meteorological exposures than did North Carolina. 158 Second, rather than spend dollars up front to fund in place reinsurance
for the next levels of risk (layers 3, 4, and 5 on the left), the state relied on
the sale of bonds, mostly post-event bonds backed by an assortment of assessments. 159 A focus on this use of bonding as a financial mechanism is
discussed immediately below.
Third, the top of Texas’ tower (right side) vaguely describes a financial
plan to cover losses above $3.65 billion as “undetermined,” which was an
amount far below the industry’s prudent contingency benchmark 1-in-100year PML event (which, by way of reference, in 2015 in Texas was $4.9
billion). 160 In short, a simple snapshot of TWIA taken in 2012, based on its
financial plan alone, would have revealed a fairly contingent financial structure on which was based a tradition of chronically underpriced insurance
rates enabling overdevelopment of the Texas coast in areas of hurricane
danger, a we’ll-worry-about-it-when-it-happens financial plan for postevent bonding, and no real financial plan at all for a worst-case event within
the insurance industry’s 1-in-100-year PML planning horizon.
TWIA’s use of bonds in layers 3, 4, and 5 raises three other issues. The
first involves a matter of timing and whether the bonds are to be arranged
post-event or pre-event. Prior to the enactment by the Texas legislature of
House Bill 3 in 2011, TWIA could only issue post-event bonds, which incurred the risk that a serious storm would require financing at a time the
bond market was weak or, as was the case with Hurricane Ike that caused
enormous damage to Texas in 2008 at the height of the financial crisis, virtually nonexistent. 161 Second, the ability to raise funding after-the-fact helps
to suppress rate adequacy ex ante, which only magnifies the moral hazard
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See Figure 4, supra note 94.
See id.
158
See id.
159
See id.
160
See POLAK, supra note 148, at 6, 30.
161
See Chad Hemenway, Reform Bill Gives TWIA Ability to Issue Pre-Event Bonds, PROPERTY
CASUALTY 360° (June 29, 2011), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2011/06/29/reform-billgives-twia-ability-to-issue-pre-event.
157

376

Environmental Affairs

[Vol. 43:345

that low rates will actually incentivize building poorly in harm’s way. 162
And finally, the various assessment pools available for bond financing raise
questions of cross-subsidies and fairness. 163 Not all of the implications are
bad. For example, as seen below, under TWIA’s newest financing tower,
“Class I securities,” the first layer of debt financing, are to be secured with
assessments solely on TWIA policyholders. 164
At least in this situation, those who most benefited from the artificially
lower rates caused by post-event financing will be the first on the hook in
the event that more is needed. In contrast, in North Carolina, should retained surplus not be enough, an assessment is made on North Carolina insurers generally (whether or not they write at the coast), a statewide financial contingency for which presumably North Carolina insurers obtain
statewide rates. On the other hand, TWIA “Class II securities,” the next layer in the tower, are repaid 30 percent by assessments on insurance companies generally (presumably accounted for in statewide rates), and 70 percent
on a mix of TWIA policies as well as on non-TWIA coastal homeowners/wind policies, coastal business fire insurance, and coastal personal/commercial auto policies, forcing those who did not benefit from low
TWIA rates to pay for the losses suffered by TWIA policyholders who did
enjoy those rates. 165 Finally, TWIA “Class 3 securities” are placed on those

162
See TWIA Raises Rates, supra note 153 (“TWIA has a longstanding problem, in that the rates
charged by the agency for its policies are not nearly enough to meet expected future claims.”). As to
the link between a post-hoc bonding strategy and unduly low rates ex ante, see Letter from Robin
Smith Wescott, Florida Office of Insurance Consumer Advocate to Federal Insurance Office, to
Director McGrath, Federal Insurance Office 1–2 (June 24, 2013) (on file with the Boston College
Environmental Affairs Law Review) (“[The state] has relied heavily upon . . . bonding capacity . . . to
pay claims in the event of a hurricane . . . . These events have facilitated lower rates in the marketplace; lower than what most would deem actuarially sound.”). As to the link between poor insurance
design generally and losses suffered during Hurricane Ike on the Bolivar Peninsula, see Gulf Coast
Construction Deemed ‘Woefully Inadequate’ for Storm Surge, INS. J. (Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.
insurancejournal.com/magazines/features/2009/10/05/158797.htm [https://perma.cc/9RDH-TQXP]
(describing how homes on the Bolivar Peninsula in Texas built to higher elevations than those
required by FEMA’s base-flood-elevations under the National Flood Insurance Program survived
Hurricane Ike storm surge, while those built only to the federal requirements did not).
163
See ROBERT P. HARTWIG & CLAIRE WILKINSON, INS. INFO. INST., RESIDUAL MARKET PROPERTY PLANS: FROM MARKETS OF LAST RESORT TO MARKETS OF FIRST CHOICE 19 (2011), http://
www.iii.org/sites/default/files/ResidualMarketUpdate2011rh.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8LUK-EVXT]
(detailing how a study by the Insurance Research Council found that “63 percent of those from interior counties and non-coastal states believe policyholder subsidies for wind damage coverage in
coastal areas are unfair”).
164
See Seth Chandler, Insurance Commissioner Tries to Fix Fatal Bug in Windstorm Statute,
TEX. WINDSTORM (Mar. 4, 2014), http://catrisk.net/tag/twia/ [https://perma.cc/C8FG-YACL].
165
See id.
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insurers in the state who are forced to participate in TWIA, again externalizing costs across the state for benefits received primarily at the coast.166
With this financial baseline in mind, TWIA’s finances since 2012 have
improved. Due to a series of incremental rate increases, some legislative
and administrative changes, and a few years of relatively mild weather,
TWIA’s 2015 financial tower at Figure 5 167 shows somewhat greater resilience:
Figure 5—TWIA Financial Tower for 2015

Again, there are three noteworthy points about TWIA’s change of circumstances between 2012 and 2015. First, due to relatively mild weather,
funds have built up in the bottom of the tower (increasing from $300 million in 2012 to $600 million in 2015), and surplus funds also allowed for an
enhanced reinsurance program at the top of the tower (now including
TWIA’s use of catastrophe bonds as well), providing for coverage up to the
industry standard 1-in-100-year PML event.168 But, second, TWIA still continues to substitute the sale of public securities after a storm event for having enough funds on hand ahead of time through adequate premium rates to
pre-pay for full coverage up front, as does North Carolina. 169 Which leads,
166

See id.
See TEX. WINDSTORM INS. ASS’N, 2015 MEDIA BRIEFING BOOK 7–8 (2015) https://www.
twia.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/TWIA_Media_Handbook_October_2015.pdf.pdf [https://perma.
cc/4F9A-4LMT]. See generally POLAK, supra note 148 (discussing TWIA’s finances).
168
See supra notes 29, 77 and accompanying text.
169
See supra notes 29, 77 and accompanying text.
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third, to the danger not only that TWIA operates as a vehicle to enable suppressed rates that carry with them the moral hazard of encouraging development in harm’s way, but also the danger that a storm could coincide with
poor economic conditions in which no one would want to buy TWIA’s
Class 1 public securities or even its somewhat-better-secured Class 2 public
securities. 170
C. The Florida Citizens Property Insurance Corporation
For the purposes of focusing on state-level catastrophe financing, it is
instructive, lastly, to consider Florida, the state most at risk of suffering
weather catastrophe losses. 171 In 2002, Florida Governor Jeb Bush oversaw
the creation of the state’s residual-insurance entity, the Florida Citizens
Property Insurance Corporation (“Florida Citizens”), as an “insurer of last
resort” allowed to offer rates only if they were “higher than the private market.” 172 But the possibility of severe rate increases following a series of hurricanes that struck Florida in 2004 and 2005 led Governor Charlie Christ
and the Florida legislature in 2007 to abandon that requirement. 173 Rates
were decreased, eligibility requirements relaxed, and a substantial increase
in subsidized reinsurance for Florida Citizens was authorized to be provided
by the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (“FHCF”), a state reinsurance
facility created in 1993. 174 The predictable result was a huge increase in
Florida Citizens’ book of business—it soon became Florida’s largest property insurer, “with more than a million policies and $400 billion in exposure.” 175 By 2012, Florida Citizens considered two alternative financial
170
Indeed, TWIA has had trouble being able to issue Class I bonds. See supra notes 29, 77
and accompanying text.
171
See R.J. Lehmann, Lasting Reforms for Florida’s Property Insurance Market, 75 JAMES
MADISON INST.: BACKGROUNDER, Jan. 2015, at 1, 3, http://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/01/2015-Insurance-Study-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9HY-SAQC] (describing how Florida has more property at risk than all other “hurricane alley” states combined, a total coastal exposure in excess of $2.9 trillion).
172
See Carolyn Kousky, Managing Natural Catastrophe Risk: State Insurance Programs in
the United States, 5 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 153, 163 (2011). Excellent background treatment of the organizational origins of Florida Citizens is found in NEWMAN, supra note 125, at 25
(describing how Florida Citizens formed in 2002 when Florida Residential Property and Casualty
Joint Underwriting Association and the Florida Windstorm Underwriting Association were combined); see also Evan Lehmann, How Jeb Bush Handled Risky Business in a Disaster-Prone State,
CLIMATEWIRE (July 6, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060021245 [https://perma.cc/
HBR2-J6S2] (illustrating how Governor Bush oversaw the creation of Florida Citizens).
173
See CITIZENS PROP. INS. CO., 2012 SEASON ANALYSIS 4 (2012) (on file with the author);
Kousky, supra note 172, at 163.
174
See NEWMAN, supra note 125, at 32.
175
See Kousky, supra note 172, at 163.
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strategies to handle its worst-case obligations, depicted below in Figures 6
and 7: 176
Figure 6—Florida Financial Tower, 2012 (alternative version A)

In “Version A” of Florida’s 2012 financial tower, shown in Figure 5
above, there are four salient features. First, rather than turn first to retained
earnings (shown above as “surplus”) before considering other options, Florida spreads out its use of surplus over the first three tranches. Normally, this
would come at a cost because it would lower the attachment point at which
private reinsurance would first be engaged, and thus raise reinsurance rates
because there was greater risk to the reinsurer of having to pay. 177 But, second, Florida gets around this problem by showing in its second tranche
payments from the FHCF, the public reinsurance facility operated and
funded by the state itself. 178 The idea of having government-provided reinsurance as a financing strategy has been criticized because it concentrates
losses within-state rather than spreading them more efficiently globally
through private reinsurance, but is not without rough analogs in such other
176
See Email from Gina Schwitzgebel, Gen. Manager, NCIUA to author (Sept. 28, 2012) (on
file with the author).
177
See supra note 106 and accompanying text (explaining attachment points).
178
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, FLA. STATE BD. OF ADMIN., http://www.sbafla.com/fhcf/
[https://perma.cc/ESK9-97VP].
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public insurance programs as federal terrorism insurance and California
earthquake insurance. 179 The FHCF in 2012 was capitalized at $18 billion,
capital backed by the State’s authority to impose assessments on policyholders (not insurers) holding home, auto, boat, and motorcycle policies. 180
Third, Figure 6 also reflects the possibility of overlapping consumer charges
to reimburse Florida Citizens for past payments, as reflected in the fourth
layer, to impose on all Florida Citizens property insureds (alone) a surcharge of approximately $1 billion. 181 Fourth, rather than turn to the capital
markets for alternative risk financing, Version A of the Florida Citizens
tower would impose at the top tier a $2 billion emergency assessment on the
State’s property insureds.
Florida also considered an alternative financing plan in 2012, shown
below as Figure 7: 182

179
See Lehmann, supra note 171, at 7 (“The [Florida] Cat Fund turns the principle of diversification on its head by concentrating Florida’s peak hurricane risk within the state, rather than spreading it around the world, as private reinsurers do.”). See generally CAL. EARTHQUAKE AUTH., THE
EARTHQUAKE INS. AFFORDABILITY ACT (n.d.), http://www.earthquakeauthority.com/media/Site
Assets/Pages/Media-Resources/Earthquake%20Insurance%20Affordability%20Act%20-%20%20
Protecting%20Homeowners%20and%20Taxpayers.pdf [https://perma.cc/88V8-Q72N]; Anne Gron
& Alan O. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets: A Role for the Government as Insurer? 36
IND. L. REV. 447, 447 (2003).
180
See Press Release, Reuters, Fitch Affirms Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund Finance
Corp. at ‘AA’ (Apr. 24, 2012, 1:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUS203666+24-Apr2012+BW20120424 [https://perma.cc/AJM8-QE3N].
181
See Figure 6, supra note 94.
182
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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Figure 7—Florida Financial Tower, 2012 (alternative version B)

Alternative B in Florida Citizens’ 2012 financial tower reflects changes that
were beginning to sweep catastrophe insurance markets worldwide. 183 First,
a huge surge in private capital flooding reinsurance and alternative-riskfinancing (cat bond) markets worldwide had so driven down the price of
private coverage that Florida actively contemplated updating its financial
plan to take advantage of this development. 184 Thus, Alternative B would
turn to capital markets to provide alternative risk financing through the Everglades Re Cat Bond (4th layer), perhaps reflecting increasing concern that
over-extending the FHCF was exerting too great a drag on Florida’s credit
rating. 185 Second, for similar reasons, Florida considered going to the private reinsurance market (4th and 5th layers), rather because the cost of private reinsurance had become competitive with FHCF pricing. 186 Third, in
the 7th layer, the state began experimenting with the idea of a “regular” assessment in addition to the 8th layer “emergency” assessment, illustrating
the risk that, in Florida, policyholders were increasingly facing a variety of
different and sometimes overlapping surcharges and assessments in addition
183

See Figure 7, supra note 94.
See, e.g., Myles Neligan & Ben Berkowitz, Analysis: Investors Turning to Reinsurance for
Juiced Returns, REUTERS (May 29, 2012, 3:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-reinsuranceinvestors-idUSBRE84S17H20120529 [https://perma.cc/D3ZR-RQ69]; see Figure 7, supra note 94.
185
See Figure 7, supra note 94.
186
See id.
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to rising Florida Citizens rates. 187 In short, assessment-fatigue was beginning to become a political issue in Florida. 188
But perhaps the most valuable insight from studying Florida’s approach to storm insurance is the degree to which “depopulation” has become a major financial strategy. Depopulation is a program whereby a residual entity deliberately adopts mechanisms to shed its policyholders into
the private market. 189 Certainly it is not a new idea. In the mid-1990s, Florida Citizens’ precursor began a depopulation program that provided bonuses
of $100 per policy to new insurance companies willing to accept these risks
for a minimum of three years. 190 The results were unsurprisingly mixed,
given the insurability issues that led most major insurers to abandon the
private wind market in the first place. Many of the policies returned to Florida Citizens at the end of three years, and some of the new companies went
bankrupt for lack of capital with the 2004 and 2005 hurricanes, “requiring
the state to cover their losses through the state guarantee association.” 191
Nonetheless, with the election of Florida Governor Rick Scott, a freemarket-oriented Republican, the idea of depopulating Florida Citizens received a major political push. 192 In 2013, Governor Scott signed Senate Bill
1770, designed to return Florida Citizens to its previous status as an insurer
of last resort, partly by prohibiting subsidized coverage for new construction in environmentally sensitive areas and partly by creating a “clearinghouse” by which existing policyholders would be steered to private carriers
but with temporary protection against rate increases. 193

187

See id.
See, e.g., News Release, Fla. Chamber of Commerce, Elimination of Hurricane Tax Assessments Means More Money in the Pockets of Floridians (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.flchamber.
com/article/elimination-hurricane-tax-assessments-means-money-pockets-floridians/ [https://perma.
cc/SH5V-CPEK].
189
See, e.g., Florida Citizens Depopulation Program Frequently Asked Questions, HERITAGE
INS., http://www.heritagepci.com/resources/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/Y7EU-RMC8].
190
See Kousky, supra note 172, at 165.
191
Id.
192
See Florida Homeowners Insurance Bill Passes This Week, LIVE INS. NEWS (May 2, 2013),
http://www.liveinsurancenews.com/florida-homeowners-insurance-bill-passes-this-week/
[https://
perma.cc/9WVA-4ZTQ]; Governor Scott Signs Bill to Reform Citizens, FLGOV.COM, http://www.
flgov.com/governor-scott-signs-bill-to-reform-citizens-2/ [https://perma.cc/9ZZE-WESP] (“[T]his
law helps protect the environment by removing subsidies for new construction in environmentally
sensitive coastal areas.”). The bill also prevents Florida Citizens “from insuring homes valued at
over $1 million, a cap that gets lowered gradually until it reache[s] $700,000 in 2017.” Chad
Hemenway, Florida Gov. Scott Signs Bill to Reform Last-Resort Insurer, PROPERTY CASUALTY
360° (May 30, 2013), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2013/05/30/florida-gov-scott-signsbill-to-reform-last-resort.
193
See Governor Scott Signs Bill to Reform Citizens, supra note 192.
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In the two years since, the extent of depopulation of policies from
Florida Citizens has been remarkable; from a peak of 1.5 million policies in
2012, Florida Citizens had shed hundreds of thousands of policies and, by
January 2015, had plans to reduce the policy count to 670,000 (more than a
50% reduction) within a year or two. 194 And the most common political justification for the “takeout” movement has been freedom from assessments;
both from the point of view of Florida Citizens itself (with fewer policyholders, less need to rely on assessments) and from the point of view of nonCitizens policyholders who would not be tapped for some “Citizens-only”
assessments once they were insured by private, takeout companies. 195 The
effect of depopulation on Florida Citizens financial strategy is well captured
in the following chart at Figure 8 196 provided by Florida Citizens in 2015:

194
See Carolina Bolado, Fla.’s State Insurer Plows Through Policy Sell-Off in 2015, LAW360
(Jan. 8, 2015, 6:18 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/609231/fla-s-state-insurer-plows-throughpolicy-sell-off-in-2015 [https://perma.cc/9BRJ-K5XU]; see also Florida OIR Approves Removal of
up to 427,584 Policies from Citizens, INS. J. (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
southeast/2014/09/05/339742.htm [https://perma.cc/J6VL-7ML2] (reporting the removal of Florida
Citizen policies).
195
See Barry Gilway, Citizens Taking ‘Bold Yet Responsible’ Depopulation Step, PROPERTY
CASUALTY 360° (May 24, 2013), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2013/05/24/citizens-takingbold-yet-responsible-depopulation (“More importantly, the agreement will cut potential assessments
on Floridians by $439 million in the event of a 1-in-100 year storm.”). “For the 60,000 [takeout]
policyholders, the arrangement . . . will reduce their assessment risk, which for Citizens policyholders
can reach 45 percent of premium.” Id.
196
See JOHN ROLLINS & BRIAN DONOVAN, CITIZENS PROP. INS. CORP., 2016 FLORIDA CITIZENS RATE FILING 7 (2016), https://www.citizensfla.com/documents/20702/24721/09Bd_2016_
Rates_Presentation.pdf/2c01a854-ceb6-45c4-a585-b4ed6b78d956 [https://perma.cc/CYD9-WSZX].
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Figure 8—Effect of Depopulation on Florida Citizens’ Financing

Whatever the short-term effect on Citizens’ balance sheet, the longterm efficacy of depopulation remains, in fact, uncertain. In the short-term,
the chart in Figure 8 shows simultaneously a growing reduction in Florida
Citizens’ policyholders (growing “depopulation” in the top layer), a growing residual-plan surplus, and reduced assessments. 197 All of which, again in
the short term, are good. 198 There has also been a reduction in Florida Citizens’ reliance on state-provided reinsurance through the FHCF, a positive
step toward increasing the state of Florida’s credit-worthiness, and a corresponding increase in private risk transfer through market-based reinsurance
and cat bond mechanisms, which spread risks more efficiently globally than
would have placement with FHCF and therefore are also considered positive developments. 199 The question is the long-term sustainability of these
gains. For the last few years, Florida has enjoyed a string of notably quiet
hurricane seasons, allowing surplus to grow; independently, there has been
an explosion of capital into reinsurance and alternative-finance market that
has driven down private reinsurance rates, allowing both Florida Citizens
and the new crop of smaller takeout companies to externalize their risks
cheaply. 200
197

See Figure 8, supra note 94.
See id.
199
See id.
200
See RenaissanceRe Holdings’ (RNR) CEO Kevin O'Donnell on Q1 2015 Results—
Earnings Call Transcript, SEEKING ALPHA (May 7, 2015, 2:39 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/
198
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As the rating agency A.M. Best concluded in a recent report: “[Takeout
companies have been] afforded . . . the opportunity to capitalize on extremely favorable reinsurance market conditions.” 201 Whether the private takeout
market could withstand a change in circumstances is unclear. A flavor of the
conflicting opinions on the subject can be found in exchanges between investors who acknowledge being “short” some of the takeout companies
(and therefore have a vested interest in downgrading the companies’ prospects), and those who admit being “long” (and therefore have an interest in
defending their investments). 202 Perhaps the most muted conclusion is that
of A.M. Best, which said of the takeout companies as a group: “[T]here is
significant risk in these strategies as proper risk management . . . risk analytics and overall infrastructure to effectively manage the [new] growth are
in some cases untested.” 203
CONCLUSION
Although the legal literature on storm insurance has focused on federal
flood insurance and important, but relatively simple questions of rate ade-

article/3151316-renaissancere-holdings-rnr-ceo-kevin-odonnell-on-q1-2015-results-earnings-calltranscript [https://perma.cc/APS6-HY8Q] (“While we are all thankful that Florida has not experienced a major hurricane in almost a decade, it is our belief that the risk of an event in Florida has not
changed. Recent good fortune should to alter one’s analysis of the risk.”); The Unsustainable State of
the Florida Property Insurance Markey, Part IV, SEEKING ALPHA (Nov. 3, 2014, 6:50 PM), http://
seekingalpha.com/article/2633085-the-unsustainable-state-of-the-florida-property-insurance-marketpart-iv [https://perma.cc/E236-NNTC] (“Capital has flooded into reinsurance pressuring rates,
reducing a key expense for [new takeout companies]. Resulting cost savings makes Citizens’ current depopulation effort appear successful and the [companies’] business model viable.”). It bears
emphasis that this source, RH Analytics, discloses that it is “short HCI,” one of Florida’s leading
take-out companies, raising questions about the motives of the author.
201
See BEST’S SPECIAL REPORT, FLORIDA PROPERTY INSURERS REMAIN UNTESTED: WILL
2015 BE THE YEAR? 3 (2015), http://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/AM%20Best%
20Report%20on%20Florida%20Property%20Market%207-20-2015%20(T1132804xB2E7A).pdf
[https://perma.cc/MJ4S-22LK].
202
See, e.g., Alfred L. Angelici, HCI Group Inc.: The Shorts Don’t Know They’re Swimming
Naked, SEEKING ALPHA (Aug. 10, 2015, 7:11 PM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/3425196-hcigroup-inc-the-shorts-dont-know-theyre-swimming-naked?li_source=LI&II_medium=liftigniterwidget [https://perma.cc/3XZR-U7H8] (describing concern regarding how the company at issue
has had 31 consecutive quarters of profitability; therefore, “[h]ow . . . can the [s]hort [s]ellers
justify their levered positions; especially when all the current and past published data, points in the
exact opposite direction?”); see HCI Group: The Wizards of Tampa, SEEKING ALPHA (Sept. 16,
2014, 2:17 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/2497285-hci-group-the-wizards-of-tampa [https://
perma.cc/YE9Z-C9J5] (nine takeout companies failed between 2006 and 2011 without a single
hurricane making landfall in Florida; takeout companies receive bonuses collectively totally $150
million to take on these risks).
203
See BEST’S SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 201, at 3–4
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quacy, 204 an investigation of state residual-risk wind entities reveals a more
fluid and experimental set of approaches to the financing of storm risk.
What remains unclear, however, is whether these experiments in fiscal federalism are evolving toward sustainable improvements in storm-risk financing or whether, despite their complexities, they remain for those who are
drawn to the beauty of the Nation’s hurricane-prone coasts and beaches, just
a shell game.

204

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

